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Jean-Loup Chappelet
Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), University of Lausanne, Chavannes-
Lausanne, Switzerland
ABSTRACT
This conceptual paper proposes a new framework for evaluating
the two central facets of Olympic Games performance: their deliv-
ery and their legacy. This framework, which I call the “Olympic
diamond”, is based on classic concepts of managerial perform-
ance and public policy evaluation, developed over many years by
managers and political scientists to measure public action.
Indeed, the Olympic Games, which are now attributed seven years
before they take place, have become a sort of public policy/pro-
gramme or, more accurately, a partnership between the public
authorities and private actors within a given territory (city, region,
country). This partnership requires public bodies to work closely
with private non-profit organisations and for-profit companies
over a period of 12 years or more to implement a vast series of
measures. Section 1 shows how the Games have evolved from a
purely private affair to a true public policy, and discusses what is
meant by Games performance. Section 2 reviews recent attempts
to measure or evaluate this performance. The final section
presents an approach to evaluating Olympic performance – the
Olympic diamond – and describes its four vertices and five evalu-
ation criteria, drawing on the 2012 London Olympics to illustrate
how this framework can be applied. The conclusion discusses the
Olympic diamond’s potential for evaluating and comparing other
editions of the Games or other Olympics-related projects and
facilities.
超越遗产:评估奥运会表现
这篇概念性论文提出了一个新的框架来评估奥运会两个核心方面
的表现:它们的传递和它们的遗产。我把这个框架称为“奥运钻石”,
它基于管理绩效和公共政策评估的经典概念, 是管理者和政治学
家多年来为衡量公共行动而发展起来的。事实上, 奥运会现在被
认为是在七年前举行的, 它已经成为一种公共政策/方案, 或者更准
确地说, 成为一个特定领土(城市、地区、国家)内公共当局和私人
行动者之间的伙伴关系。这种伙伴关系要求公共机构在12年或更
长时间内与私营非盈利组织和营利性公司密切合作, 以实施一系
列广泛的措施。第一章节展示了奥运会如何从一个纯粹的私人事
务演变成一个真正的公共政策, 并讨论了什么是奥运会的表现。
第二章节回顾了最近衡量或评估这种性能的尝试。最后一章节介
绍了一种评估奥林匹克表现的方法——奥林匹克钻石——并描述
了它的四个顶点和五个评价标准, 并以2012年伦敦奥运会为例来
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说明如何应用这个框架。结论讨论了奥林匹克钻石在评价和比较
其他版本的奥运会或其他与奥运会有关的项目和设施方面的潜
力。
1. Introduction
Juan Antonio Samaranch, president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
from 1980 to 2001, always ensured his speeches at Olympic Games closing ceremo-
nies included a laudatory sound bite the media could pick up on. This enabled him
to put a positive spin on every edition of an event whose organisation the IOC has
overseen since 1894 and which is virtually its only source of revenue. Samaranch
even went as far as describing Sydney 2000, his final Olympics as IOC president, as
the “best Games ever”. His successors have continued this tradition, albeit using
more subtle turns of phrase. Jacques Rogge, for example, chose to paraphrase
Britain’s national anthem, declaring the London 2012 Olympics to have been “happy
and glorious”, whereas Thomas Bach referred to Rio’s nickname when he praised the
2016 Olympics as “marvellous Games in the marvellous city”. Later, acknowledging
the fact that Rio 2016 had been staged successfully in a particularly difficult context,
the IOC said the event could be described as the “most perfect imperfect Games”
(Grohmann, 2016).
Nevertheless, it is unanimously agreed that while organising a successful Games is
essential, it is not enough to vindicate the decision to host the event. In other words,
17 days (current duration of both the Summer and Winter Olympics) of sporting
competitions do not justify the massive financial and human investment involved in
staging the Olympics; for a Games to be deemed a success, it must also leave behind
a positive legacy. This imperative has been recognised by the Olympic Charter since
2004, with Rule 2.14 stipulating “to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic
Games to the host cities and host countries” as one of the IOC’s fundamental mis-
sions. Who can define what is “a positive legacy” is unclear as we know this defin-
ition can vary from stakeholders to stakeholders (mayor, city official, inhabitants,
businesses, etc.).
The importance of Olympic legacies is reflected in the huge number of research
papers and academic conferences the subject has generated since the turn of the cen-
tury (e.g., de Moragas, Kennett, and Puig, 2003). In 2014, the IOC itself set up a
Sustainability and Legacy (formerly Sport and Environment) Commission to study
the issue and put forward a strategy. A recent literature review (Scheu & Preuss,
2017) uncovered more than 863 academic papers relating to Olympic legacies, 204 of
which were analysed in detail. However, very few of these papers describes a method
for measuring and evaluating Olympic legacies.
The present conceptual paper proposes a framework for evaluating the two central
facets of Olympic Games performance: their delivery and their legacy. (The neutral
term “performance” is preferable to more emotive terms such as “success”, “impact”,
“failure” or “benefits” which is defined differently by different stakeholders.) This
framework, which I call the “Olympic diamond”, is based on classic concepts of
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managerial performance and public policy evaluation, developed over many years by
managers and political scientists to measure public action. Indeed, the Olympic
Games, which are now. Attributed seven years before they take place, have become a
sort of public policy/programme or, more accurately, a partnership between the pub-
lic authorities and private actors within a given territory (city, region, country). This
partnership requires public bodies (municipal, regional and national authorities, pub-
lic agencies, etc.) to work closely with private non-profit organisations (IOC, local
organising committee, national Olympic committee, etc.) and for-profit companies
(sponsors, suppliers, hotel owners, developers, etc.) over a period of 12 years or more
to implement a vast series of measures.
Section 1 shows how the Games have evolved from a purely private affair to a
true public policy requiring a specific form of governance, and discusses what is
meant by Games performance. Section 2 reviews recent attempts to measure or
evaluate this performance. The final section presents a new approach to evaluating
performance - the Olympic diamond - and describes its four vertices and five edges
(see Figure 1), drawing on the 2012 London Olympics to illustrate how this frame-
work can be applied. The conclusion discusses the Olympic diamond’s potential for
evaluating and comparing other editions of the Games, most notably the Winter
Youth Olympic Games, inaugurated in 2012, or other Olympics-related projects
and facilities.
2. Increasing Public Sector Involvement in Delivering the Olympic Games
Until the 1960s for the Summer Olympics and the 1980s for the Winter Olympics,
the Games tended to be organised by private, although not-for-profit, bodies in the
shape of local Organising Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOG), which
Figure 1. The public action framework.
Source: Adapted and translated from Santo & Verrier 1993, p. 124.
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coordinated all the necessary operations and construction work. The period following
World War II, especially the Cold War, saw significant growth in the size and
importance of the Games, first for the Summer Olympics and then, after 1994, when
the Olympic calendar was changed so the Winter Games are held two years after the
Summer Games rather than in the same year, for the Winter Olympics. In fact, the
stature of the Olympics was such that the Italian (Rome 1960), Japanese (Tokyo 1964,
Sapporo 1972), and German (Munich 1972) governments saw hosting them as a way
of marking their country’s return to the “concert of nations”. Similarly, the Mexico
1968, Sarajevo 1984 and Seoul 1988 Olympics were seen by their host nations as a
sign they had been admitted to this “concert”, on a par with the countries of the
West, which had monopolised the Games until then.
Municipal and regional governments also became increasingly involved in organis-
ing the Games. For example, Montreal’s mayor, Jean Drapeau, obtained the 1976
Olympics as a way of building on the success of the 1967 World’s Fair (from his
point of view) and cementing the city’s position as a global metropolis. When
Barcelona was awarded the 1992 Games, the OCOG was presided by the city’s mayor
in person, backed by strong support from his region, which saw the Games as a way
of expressing Catalonia’s autonomy from Madrid. Similarly, Grenoble’s municipal
councillors were heavily involved, alongside the French government, in organising the
1968 Winter Olympics. Such local and regional government involvement has been
the norm for every edition of the Summer Games since the 1960s (and sometimes
before that, e.g., Berlin 1936).
However, by the late 1970s the Games had lost much of their attractiveness for
municipal, regional and national politicians, due to the huge deficit posted by
Montreal 1976 (financed by Quebec’s provincial government), repeated Olympic boy-
cotts (1972, 1976 and 1980) and Denver’s withdrawal from the 1976 Winter Games
(replaced by Innsbruck, which had hosted the 1964 Games). As a result, the IOC
received just one bid to host the 1980 Winter Olympics (Lake Placid) and 1984
Summer Olympics (Los Angeles) and only two bids for the 1984 Winter Olympics
and 1988 Summer Olympics. Enthusiasm for hosting the Olympics was revived by
the success of Los Angeles 1984 and Calgary 1988, which gave the idea that a
“private” OCOG (as in these two Olympics) could deliver the Games without strong
public financial support and even make a profit (on the operational budget, since
there was no investment budget). As a result, no fewer than eleven cities bid to host
the 2004 Summer Olympics, five of which were presented to the IOC for the final
vote. However, eagerness to stage the Olympics has faded once again, with very few
candidates coming forward to host the 2022 (awarded to Beijing), 2024 (Paris) and
2028 (Los Angeles) Games (Chappelet, 2017).
The last edition of the Games to try and severely restrict public sector involvement
was Atlanta 1996, which nevertheless received substantial support from the American
government, as shown by the report issued by the United States’ General Accounting
Office (GAO, 2001). What is more, a promise by the bid committee meant that
Atlanta’s OCOG had to set up a para-public agency – the Metropolitan Atlanta
Olympic Games Authority (MAOGA) – to provide the deficit guarantee required by
the IOC and to coordinate the different public and private stakeholders. In this
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respect, the State of Georgia, of which Atlanta is the capital, provided a large subsidy.
Even with this public support, Atlanta 1996 had great difficulty balancing its budget
and the transportation and security problems that arose during the Games severely
compromised the event’s delivery. It remains to be seen how the recently-formed
OCOG for Los Angeles 2028 will manage to stage these Games, as, even though both
the city and the State of California have promised US$250 million deficit guarantees,
it will not receive any financial guarantees from the federal government (although
there will probably be some sort of federal contribution, mostly in kind, as in 1984).
Aware of how difficult it is to deliver the Games without a close partnership
between the public authorities and private organisations, New South Wales’ provincial
government set up a series of governmental agencies for the Sydney 2000 Olympics.
Coordinated by a Ministry for the Olympics, each agency was responsible for a spe-
cific task: Sydney Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (SOCOG) – opera-
tions; Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA) – construction work; Olympic Roads
and Transport Authority (ORTA) – transport services; and Olympic Security
Command Center (OSCC) – security during the Games and the preparation phase.
These agencies worked closely with Australia’s federal government. The only non-
public Australian organisation intimately involved in delivering the 2000 Olympics
was the Australian Olympic Committee, which had given up its prerogatives on
organising the event in exchange for a share of the profits of AU$100 million
(Brabazon, 1999).
Nearly all Olympic Games summer and winter hosts since 2000 have adopted a
similar public-private model, which is why it is possible to say that delivery of the
Games is now a sort of public-private partnership, with the size of the public and pri-
vate components depending on the traditions of the host country and the autonomy
of its national Olympic committee (Beijing 2008 and Sochi 2014 were predominantly
public; Atlanta 1996 and Salt Lake City 2002 were predominantly private). Moreover,
since Sydney 2000, all summer and winter host countries have also adopted specific
“Olympic laws”.
Due to this indispensable involvement of the public authorities, and the increas-
ingly blurred boundary between public and private expenditure, it has become neces-
sary to monitor Olympic budgets and spending, a task that is usually carried out by
the government bodies responsible for evaluating public expenditure. Consequently,
detailed analyses of public contributions to staging several editions of the Games are
available for scrutiny. This is the case for Los Angeles 1984, Atlanta 1996 and Salt
Lake City 2002 (by the [US] Government Accountability Office, formerly known as
the General Accounting Office), Vancouver 2010 (by Heritage Canada) and London
2012 (by the UK’s National Audit Office – NAO). The finances of other recent
Olympic projects (Sochi 2014, Rio 2016) are less transparent or reliable. In France, an
Olympic law has been enacted to entrust the country’s audit office (Cour des
Comptes) to auditing the finances relating to the Paris 2024 Olympics. A research
programme should be established to assess these Games heritage thanks to indicators
of sustainable development.
It is the duty of such public audit bodies to evaluate the performance of Olympic
Games held within their country. Hence, the NAO published the following verdict
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after London 2012: “by any reasonable measure the Games were a success and the
big picture is that they delivered value for money” (NAO 2012: 8). But what do
“success” and “value for money” mean? Was the event a “success” and “value for
money” for its financial backers? For the public? For sponsors? For the IOC? For
other stakeholders? Best value for money is often defined as the most advantageous
combination of cost, quality and sustainability to meet customer requirements. But
who is the Games “customer” and who defines what is the most advantageous
“combination”. As the literature shows, there are winners and losers with every edi-
tion of the Games (Preuss 2016), and any conclusions will depend on which stake-
holder’s point of view is being considered (Parent & Chappelet, 2016). In addition,
other concepts, such as “impacts”, “benefits”, “sustainability” and “legacy” are used
regularly, especially to support or oppose bids or organising (IOC, 2017).
These legacies can be categorised in a variety of ways (e.g., Cashman, 2003;
Chappelet, 2012; Preuss, 2015), reflecting the concept’s multiple dimensions. What is
more, legacy is just one of two key aspects of Olympic performance, so it is essential
not to forget the delivery of the event itself. An examination of previous attempts to
measure Olympic Games performance, presented in the following section, showed the
need for another approach to this issue, as provided by the Olympic diamond,
described in the final section.
3. Ways of Measuring Olympic Games Performance
The first attempts to measure Olympic Games performance focused entirely on the
economic dimension. Since the 1980s, consultants and academics have conducted
numerous economic impact studies, most of which were ex-ante studies commis-
sioned by the Games’ proponents and quickly done by consulting firms, often to jus-
tify a bid. Because they were carried out before the Games, some economic data
needed for an accurate analysis, such as OCOG and spectator expenditure, were
unknown and had to be estimated. Ex-post studies (on real data) are rare because few
organisations, whether supporters or opponents, are prepared to finance them, espe-
cially after the event. Most ex-ante (and ex-post) studies have been marred by import-
ant biases, not to mention numerous methodological errors (Baade, 2006: Table
16.1: 181).
Economic impact studies generally give rise to two headline figures: X million dol-
lars of added value and Y thousand jobs created by hosting the Games. These figures
concern essentially the bid and preparation phases to the Games and the Olympic
month (a period of around 8–10 years), which is when the vast majority of Olympic
expenditure takes place. In fact, as long as there are few leaks, that is, expenditure
outside the territory, the massive sums spent on preparing and staging the Games
automatically provide a boost to the host territory’s economy, according to the eco-
nomic base theory, because most of the money involved comes from outside the terri-
tory and would not have been spent in it if the Games had not taken place.
Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that these large X and Y numbers are correlated,
the vision provided by such analyses is solely economic and generally aimed at justi-
fying the expenditure the Olympics involve and winning over the host territory’s
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population. In summary, these economic impact studies are of little use to assess the
Olympic Games performance.
Moreover, the Olympics are about much more than economics; they also have
environmental and social impacts. For some, the only meaningful way of assessing a
sport event’s success is to evaluate all three components of the triple bottom line,
that is, its economic, social and environmental sustainability (Chernushenko & van
der Kamp, 2001). Environmental impact studies have been carried out for several
Olympic Games, starting with the 1980 Winter Olympics at Lake Placid (Chappelet,
2008), and some OCOGs have used these studies to obtain ISO 14000 or EMAS
environmental management certification (e.g., Turin, 2006). Inspired by the develop-
ment of corporate social responsibility within the business world, OCOGs have also
begun carrying out social impact studies, and OCOGs for future editions of the
Games have been strongly advised to conduct both environmental and social impact
studies (Barget & Gouguet, 2010). The UN-supported ESG (Environmental, Social
and Governance) indicators, which have been applied to many types of investment,
could provide a means for evaluating the sustainability of an Olympic investment.
The three dimensions (economic, social, environmental) underlying the notion of
sustainable development are vital, as they can influence decisions on whether or not
to bid for the Games, if those decisions have not already been made. They are also
essential to measuring the performance of an edition of the Games. One way of com-
bining them is to conduct a global cost-benefit analysis comparing all tangible and
intangible costs with all tangible and intangible benefits without forgetting external-
ities. The first part of such an analysis – determining and monetising costs, including
intangible costs – is relatively easy, via approaches such as “welfare economics”.
However, it is much harder to determine and monetise benefits. How much is a good
image worth? What is the value of a positive article in a major newspaper? What are
the benefits of greater participation in sport? Consequently, the conclusions of a cost-
benefit analysis are highly dependent on how benefits are monetised, which makes
the value of such studies contestable. These assessments of the net total benefits (or
costs) of the Games must therefore be interpreted with caution. In addition, they are
rarely conducted ex post, i.e. based on actual data, as interest in this type of study
drops considerably after the Games. Moreover, there is very little cost-benefit analysis
of the Games and even less in the way of more subtle analysis according to the CGE
model (Computable General Equilibrium) which has been highly influential for some
years in the evaluation of public policy projects (an exception is Giesecke & Madden,
2011, an assessment of the Sydney 2000 Games according to the CGE model).
Another important issue, but one that has rarely been considered in evaluations of
Olympic Games, is the duration of any impact. Clearly, different durations have to be
considered in line with the different stages in organising the Games; but how long
should these durations be? Answering this question is relatively straightforward for
the preparation and delivery stages, but much more difficult for the post-Games
period. Over what period an Olympic legacy should be evaluated? A year? Four years?
Ten years? Even longer? Vancouver 2010 emphasised “legacies now” during the prep-
aration phase.
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Other difficulties can also complicate Olympic impact studies. For example, how
should they take into account non-Olympic factors over the period under consider-
ation, such as variations in exchange rates, the provision of special offers for tourists
and the availability of cheap travel options? What expenditure should be considered
Olympic expenditure and what should not? Should investment in transport infra-
structure prior to the Games be categorised as Olympic expenditure, even though
these facilities will be in use for many years after the event? How large an area should
be considered when measuring impacts: the host city, the metropolitan area, the
region (province, canton, state), or the entire country? The answer to this question
will determine, for example, whether an item of Olympic expenditure is considered
to come from outside the host territory (and therefore have an additional impact) or
from inside the host territory (and therefore should have no additional impact). The
choices made when answering these questions directly affect the impact study’s con-
clusions. In addition, a lot of essential data are not available on a suitable territorial
scale due to a lack of adequate statistics.
By the beginning of the 2000s, the IOC had realised that irrefutable data in a wide
variety of domains was needed in order to evaluate Games performance. Because the
necessary data is often non-existent or difficult to obtain after the event, as the IOC
asked, they have to be collected during the organisation phase in order to facilitate
later studies. In fact, the official reports produced by OCOGs after the Games used to
include a lot of basic data, but these reports have gradually become communication
tools rather than records of factual information. For example, Salt Lake City 2002’s
official post-Games report did not provide any budget information at all
(SLOOC, 2002).
The IOC’s response to this problem of data availability and, in some cases, trans-
parency, which had made it impossible to carry out any serious comparison of the
Games, came in 2000, when it launched the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI)
project (Dubi, Hug, and van Griethuysent al., 2003). The idea of OGGI was to docu-
ment about 150 indicators in the economic, social and environmental spheres that
could be compared from Games to Games.
Under the OGGI, OCOGs for Summer and Winter Olympics held between 2004
and 2012 were obliged to form a partnership with a host-city university, which would
collect data on a range of Games indicators throughout the organisation period. The
OGGI’s 126 indicators, listed by Malfas, Theodoraki, and Houlihan, (2004) along
with an initial review of the project, covered all three spheres of sustainable develop-
ment (economic, social, and environmental). They had to be measured at four stages
during the project, giving rise to four reports, established at the start of the bidding
process (Baseline report), a year before the Games, during the Games and two years
after the Games (Post-Games report). OGGI reports were part of the IOC’s desire to
better manage knowledge of the Games, a vast enterprise launched on the basis of
the Sydney 2000 OCOG’s experiences. As a result, the OCOGs for Beijing 2008,
Vancouver 2010 and London 2012 signed research agreements with, respectively,
Renmin University in Beijing, the University of British Columbia in Vancouver and
the University of East London. The results of this research were published (Feng
2011; UBC 2013; ESCR 2015).
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Vancouver 2010 is the only edition of the Games to have implemented the OGGI
in full, with all four required reports being published online. In addition, the lead
researcher of Vancouver’s project produced a very constructive review of the research
(VanWynsberghe, 2015). OCOGs for editions of the Olympics before 2010 were too
far advanced in their preparations or did not provide the resources needed to com-
plete all four studies required by the OGGI (e.g., the OCOG for Beijing 2008 focused
on volunteers, Feng, 2011). Other OCOGs complained there were too many indica-
tors to measure and were allowed to produce just two reports (before and after the
Games). During this time, the project was renamed the Olympic Games Impact
(OGI) project, as the term “global” had frequently been interpreted as “international”,
rather than as covering all the spheres of sustainable development, as origin-
ally intended.
According to a University of British Columbia (UBC) press release, issued in
October 2013 in conjunction with publication of the OGI post-Games report: “The
2010 Winter Olympics presented an unparalleled opportunity to gain federal and pro-
vincial support for infrastructure projects like the Canada Line [a rapid transit line
from the airport to the city], says UBC research. [… ] Vancouver and Whistler resi-
dents enjoyed the biggest return after hosting the 2010 Winter Games but Canadians
across the country also benefitted from a boost in pride and nationalism (UBC,
2013).” VanWynsberghe called this countrywide boost to pride and nationalism the
“red mitten effect”, after a merchandising product bought and worn by many specta-
tors and residents. VanWynsberghe’s (2015: 14) analysis of the OGI’s methodology
led him to suggest that it “has the potential to become a summative evaluation tool
that increases knowledge concerning attribution.” He continued, “Confidence in sup-
porting a revised OGI evaluation tool is partially derived from the 2012 pre-Games
OGI report. [… ] The OGI researchers for London 2012 borrowed from and
endorsed the 2010 model in rating their indicators according to relevance, impact
and confidence in conclusion. In addition, the product of combining these scores
produced a sustainability standard for the current edition, which can, in turn, be
compared over editions.”
Despite this positive assessment, the London Organising Committee of the
Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) decided to base its analyses on the indica-
tors drawn up by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a foundation set up in 1997
that produced a battery of indicators for measuring and reporting the sustainability,
first of companies and later of all types of organisation (www.globalreporting.org).
LOCOG, together with other organisations, even triggered a “sector supplement” for
sport events, that is, an additional list of indicators specific to such events. LOCOG
also contributed to the creation of the ISO 20121 standard (Pelham, 2011), aimed at
helping sports events become sustainable, and was one of the first organising commit-
tees to be certified according to this new standard (named after the London
Games year).
Nevertheless, in order to comply with an obligation imposed on LOCOG by the
IOC in the Host City Contract, the University of East London was commissioned to
publish a report after the Games, which concluded with themed vignettes by a variety
of authors summarizing London 2012’s legacy performance with respect to fourteen
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dimensions, such as employment, culture, urban regeneration, health, sport and vol-
unteers (ESRC, 2015: 151).
From the Rio 2016 Olympics onwards, the IOC decided to stop requiring OCOGs
to set up an OGI project. Since it was created in 2014, the IOC’s Sustainability and
Legacy Commission has been working on a new framework for analysing these
dimensions, most notably in order to evaluate the sustainability and legacy of Games.
London 2012 has undoubtedly been the most closely scrutinised Olympic Games
to date, with innumerable reports commissioned since the bid stage, in addition to
the dozens of books and hundreds of papers written by researchers from the UK and
elsewhere since the Games were awarded in 2005. New publications about London
2012 continue to appear to this day, several years after the Games came to a close. A
request by the British academic publisher Routledge asking the editors of around 40
of its academic journals to produce special issues on London 2012 resulted in the
publication of almost 200 articles about the Olympics in fields as varied as music,
engineering, ecology and politics. A “Handbook of the London 2012 Olympic and
Paralympic Games” was to be published (Girginov, 2014: 5) and made an official
LOCOG product (bearing the LOCOG logo, sold in LOCOG stores, etc.). It would
have provided a self-selected dozen British academics with special access to the prepa-
rations for the Games This handbook was to supplement the official but more com-
memorative report LOCOG was contractually obliged to produce after the Games.
However, internal resistance within LOCOG about the cost and time required meant
it never saw the light of day, and it was replaced by an independent, two-volume
(before and after the Games) publication on the same subject. Again, the publisher
was Routledge, but the content of the books, which were subtitled “Making the
Games” and “Celebrating the Games”, was entirely the responsibility of the authors
and the editor (Girginov, 2014: 5).
In addition to LOCOG’s actions, the British government, which provided much of
the finance for London 2012 (see budget below), set precise objectives for the
Olympics in a document published by the ministry responsible for sport, the then
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS). These so-called “legacy promises”
were to:
1. Make the UK a world-leading sporting nation in (a) sport participation, (b) elite
sport and (c) sporting infrastructure
2. Transform the heart of East London (where the Olympic Park was to be built)
3. Inspire a generation of young people to take part in volunteering, cultural and
physical activity
4. Make the Olympic Park a blueprint for sustainable living
5. Demonstrate that the UK is a creative, inclusive and welcoming place to live in,
visit and for business (adapted from DCMS, 2008: 58).
In 2009, a sixth legacy promises was added: “Bring about lasting change to the life
experiences of disabled people.” In 2010, a centre-right coalition government took
over from the Labour government that had been in power when the Games were
awarded to London. The new government slightly reformulated these objectives,
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which LOCOG encapsulated in a succinct slogan, “Inspire a generation”, that it used
during the Games.
But the DCMS wanted to do more than draw up objectives; given the huge oper-
ational expenditure, especially for investments relating to the Games (in 2012, the
NAO (2012: 9) estimated the total cost of the Games to be around GB£11.3 billion,
but also said the final figure would be higher and known only later), it also wanted
to evaluate whether these objectives had been met. It did this by commissioning a
consortium led by Grant Thornton (and including Loughborough University and the
consultancy firms ECORYS and Oxford Economics) to carry out a “meta-evaluation”
of the Games’ legacy. This meta-evaluation assessed the outcomes of London 2012 by
combining evaluations already carried out by others, that is, by conducting a
“statistical aggregation of evidence of effects in concrete policy settings” and a
“qualitative aggregation of qualitative and/or quantitative evidence of effects claimed”.
These aggregations were complemented by an appraisal of evaluations made by others
for the Games, as a sort of quality control of the studies already carried out (Henry,
2016: 22–23).
Although such meta-evaluation methods are commonly used in fields such as
medicine and psychology, this was the first time they had been applied to determine
the impact of the Olympic Games. In fact, they are the most ground-breaking studies
of Olympic Games performance carried out to date. No subsequent edition of the
Games has copied London’s approach, which has roots in the Evidence Based
Management movement (Rand, 2007), so the five reports resulting from this meta-
evaluation are particularly precious and deserve detailed study (especially the last one,
GT, 2013).
The meta-evaluation of London 2012 revealed certain difficulties that affect all
evaluations of Games performance. First, the data collected must be both valid and
reliable in order to avoid producing biased, or even contradictory, results. London
2012’s Promise 1a (Make the UK a world-leading nation in sport participation)
clearly illustrates this issue. What counts as participation in sport (validity of the
data) and who should do the counting (reliability of the data)? In other words, it is
not enough to collect data; their value must also be assessed.
Second, the meta-evaluation highlighted the problem of “additionality”, that is, the
need to determine the net effect of the Games by assessing the outcomes of the
Olympic project per se, minus the outcomes that would have occurred even if the
Games had not been held. Most evaluations of the 2012 London Olympics have not
taken this issue into account (Henry, 2016: 26). One exception to this rule was
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ assessment of the impact of the Free Swimming programme,
set up to develop this sport in the UK among the under-16s and over-60s. Their
report led the British government to stop financing the programme because existing
swimmers were abandoning lessons outside the programme (which they had to pay
for), were being crowded out from existing lessons by swimmers on the programme
(who did not have to pay), or were simply swimming more frequently than they had
before, either within or outside the programme (Henry, 2016: 27).
In summary, the three approaches described above to evaluate the performance of
the Olympic Games are not fully satisfactory.
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4. The Olympic Diamond: A Performance Evaluation Framework
The Olympic diamond is based on two classic approaches to evaluating public action:
the traditional inputs (means or resources)-outputs-outcomes model, which Pollitt
and Et Bouckaert (2011: 16) called the “conceptual framework of [public] perform-
ance”, and the public-management triangle, which links objectives, inputs (means or
resources) and outputs (Santo & Verrier, 1993: 68; DIRE, 2002: 24). These two
approaches have been combined to form, for example, the model of public manage-
ment introduced by Switzerland’s federal administration in 2017 (Chappelet, 2018),
which Santo and Verrier (1993: 110) refer to in France and elsewhere as the public
action framework (Figure 1).
Figure 1 shows the four parameters (vertices) and five criteria (edges) that have to
be taken into account when evaluating the performance of public policies. This model
can also be applied to the Olympic Games, considered a public project implemented
in association with a variety of partners within the host territory. The resulting
“Olympic diamond” (Figure 2) incorporates the two fundamental dimensions of host-
ing the Games: their delivery and their legacy. Delivering the Olympics is imperative
for both the OCOG and the host territory’s governing authorities. Girginov (2014: 5)
expressed this perfectly in his description of the preparations for London 2012:
“successful delivery of the Games became the order of the day, and anything else was
seen as a distraction from the main goal.” The event must be delivered on time, pref-
erably within budget and to the best possible quality, but this is just an intermediate
goal. The host territory’s final goal is not, and has not been for many years, to stage
two weeks of sport competitions; it is to keep the legacy promises made to the terri-
tory’s population (by the authorities) and other stakeholders. Responsibility for deliv-
ering the Games mostly falls on the shoulders of the temporary OCOG (upper
triangle), whereas responsibility for the legacy falls on several bodies, which must be
Figure 2. The Olympic diamond (source: the author).
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coordinated by a permanent organisation close to the public authorities, here labelled
the Olympic Heritage Organisation (OHO, lower triangle).
The following paragraphs describe the parameters (vertices) and evaluation criteria
(edges) that make up the Olympic diamond, illustrating each aspect with examples
from previous editions of the Games, especially London 2012.
Olympic objectives must be the result of a strategic vision for the Games’ host ter-
ritory, based on needs identified by its elected officials. The vision for the Olympics
formulated by the organising committee for Atlanta 1996, the centenary edition of
the Games, provides a sort of generic vision of what an Olympic project’s objectives
can/should be (adapted from ACOG, 1997: 20):
1. To conduct the Games with sensitivity, integrity, fiscal responsibility, and com-
mitment to the needs of athletes;
2. To share with the world the spirit of the host country, region and city;
3. To leave a positive physical and spiritual legacy/heritage and an indelible mark
on Olympic history by staging the most memorable/unique Games ever.
In fact, every Olympic host aims (i) to deliver the best possible Games, notably for
the athletes, without incurring a deficit, (ii) to inject them with local colour, and (iii)
to leave a substantial tangible and intangible legacy. The first generic objective is the
project’s foundation; the second objective ensures an edition of the Games stands out
from other editions and transmits the host city’s, region’s and country’s message; the
third objective is a reminder that legacy is an essential issue and not limited to tan-
gible heritage.
Every host has to adapt these generic objectives to local circumstances, in line with
the requirements of sustainable development, for instance by explaining how “their”
Games should stand out from others and how they intend to achieve these generic
objectives (from strategic to action plan). If possible, objectives should be defined at
the bid phase, even if they have to be modified or added to should the Games be
obtained. The IOC’s decision to award an Olympic Games to a city can be consid-
ered, to a certain extent, an endorsement of that city’s objectives.
Unfortunately, these objectives are not always set out clearly, so the host popula-
tion tends to expect too much from the Games and/or starts wondering why they
should host them (or even demands that their city withdraws its bid, as has occurred
on several occasions since 2010). With this in mind, Olympic objectives should be
targeted for the host population and restricted in number. Moreover, it is difficult to
evaluate an Olympic project if its objectives are too vague. In some cases, the IOC
feels the need to summarise a bid’s objectives for its members (see, for example, the
IOC’s evaluation report for the three candidate cities for the 2014 Winter Olympics,
IOC, 2007: 10, 48 and 30).
After London had been awarded the Games, the DCMS formalised the objectives
for London 2012 into five legacy promises (listed above, DCMS, 2008). These objec-
tives clearly fall within the third category of generic objectives and are both tangible
(2 and 1c) and intangible (1a, 1b, 3, 4 and 5). In 2006, Britain’s parliament passed
legislation creating a new government body, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA),
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to oversee the building of sports facilities for the Games (objectives 2 and 1c), and
the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) was set up four months before
the start of the Games in order to convert Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park into a new
heart for East London (objective 4). So far, this objective appears to have been met
(Moore, 2017). During the bid stage, London’s mayor presented objectives 2 and,
indirectly, 4 as his (the city’s) main objectives for hosting the Olympics. Generic
objectives (i) and (ii) were not mentioned explicitly by the DCMS. Nevertheless,
objective (i) was an implicit requirement for operations (under the responsibility of
what was called “the Olympic Board”, whose members were drawn from LOCOG,
the ODA, the Mayor of London’s office, the Greater London Authority and the
British Olympic Association) and objective (ii) was embraced by the British govern-
ment when it greatly increased the budget for the opening ceremony, which was
designed to give a positive and up-to-date image of the UK and can be linked with
DCMS legacy promise 5 above (NAO, 2012:10, DCMS, 2008).
Inputs to the Olympic diamond (Figure 2) are the human, financial and other
resources required to deliver the Games, plus other resources, most of which are
financial and appertain to what is known as leverage funding. For example, if the
Olympic village is built by a private developer, who will sell or let the apartments
after the Games, the developer’s initial investment can be considered leverage fund-
ing. Delivering the Games requires both operational resources and investment resour-
ces. The four main sources of operational resources are, in order of importance for
London 2012: domestic sponsorship (i.e., from sponsors with rights only within the
Olympic territory), ticket sales (from spectators), the IOC’s contribution (taken from
the international television and marketing rights to the Games) and subsidies (from
the public authorities). These resources would not be available to the Olympic terri-
tory without the Games (at least not in the same amounts). Investment resources are
the sums the public authorities allocate for building sports facilities and/or general
infrastructure for the Games.
In addition to the resources required to deliver the Games, the private and public
sectors provide further resources, before or even after the Games, in order to, for
example, build hotels in the Olympic city, support national federations as a way of
improving medal chances, and cover additional expenditure by NOCs, especially the
host NOC. These resources, which are invested in the expectation of benefiting from
the Games’ leverage effect, are essential to obtaining and maintaining a true Games
legacy (Chalip, 2017). Just as important as these financial resources are the millions
of hours of work by the host territory’s civil servants (human resources), who are
taken away from their usual tasks by the Olympic project.
The total cost of delivering London 2012 was at least GB£11,331 million, financed
by LOCOG’s budget of GB£2410 million (balanced and self-financed) plus an add-
itional GB£8921 million provided by extra government funding (GB£5871 million),
National Lottery funding (GB£2175 million), and local- and regional-authority fund-
ing (GB£875 million) (NAO, 2012: 9).
The amount of leverage funding is unknown, but we know that some London
hotels and parts of the underground were renovated by their owners for the 2012
Games. In addition, between 2006 and 2012, the government agency UK Sport spent
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GB£264 million on the Talent To Podium programme, which helped British athletes
win 65 medals at their home Olympics (www.uksport.gov.uk/our-work/investing-in-
sport/historical-funding-figures). London 2012’s Olympic village was built by a private
developer (Qatar Diar, in association with Delancey Estates), but only after the ori-
ginal Australian developer had backed out, at a cost to the British taxpayer of
GB£275 million (Girginov, 2014: 8). In addition, converting the Olympic stadium for
use after the Games (roofing all the stands and installing removable seating on the
athletics track in order to turn it into a football stadium that could still be used for
athletics meetings, etc.) cost around GB£133 million, financed by the public author-
ities. London’s mayor took full control of the LLDC when an extremely critical report
revealed the massively escalated cost of this post-Games work which was managed by
the LLDC (Moore Stephens, 2017).
Outputs consist mostly of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (the Paralympic
Games have been the responsibility of the OCOG for a few Olympiads) and a number
of more-or-less obligatory Games-related programmes, such as the Olympic Cultural
Programme and the Olympic Values Education Programme. In some cases, these pro-
grammes are financed by the OCOG, but their size, and therefore cost, is left to the
OCOG’s discretion. The beneficiaries of these basic outputs are athletes, who must be
given good conditions in which to compete – for free; the IOC, which relies on the
Games for its revenues; international sport federations (IFs) and NOCs, which manage
the competitions, send their teams and receive a share of the revenues after the Games;
spectators, who buy tickets; the host population; and other stakeholders.
The London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic Games were delivered as sched-
uled, between 27th July and 2nd August 2012, and between 29th August and 9th
September 2012, respectively. LOCOG sold GB£659 million worth of tickets (NAO,
2012: 10) and received GB£651 million from the IOC, as its share of the more than
US$3500 million in broadcasting and sponsorship rights the IOC earned from the
London Games (IOC, 2018: 24). In addition to the sports competitions, LOCOG
organised a vast cultural programme (more than 500 events, exhibitions, shows and
concerts, etc. between 2008 and 2012, at a cost of GB£97 million, partly funded by
Arts Council England and Legacy Trust UK) and a sports education programme for
school athletes that culminates in the (UK) School Games, an annual event held in
Olympic or other sports venues that is sponsored by Sainsbury’s and which continues
today with finance from Legacy Trust UK. Numerous sports, cultural and other pro-
grammes were financed by private initiatives (non LOCOG) and received the
“Inspired by London 2012” label (the LOCOG logo without the Olympic Rings,
which are reserved for official sponsors). All these related programmes form part of
the output of the 2012 London Olympics and contribute to the mark they made.
Finally, outcomes are all the Games’ tangible or intangible impacts and effects,
which may be expected or unexpected, planned or unplanned, positive or negative,
short-term or long-term, linked to the territory or to a person who participated dir-
ectly or indirectly in organising the Games, etc. These outcomes can be categorised in
many different ways, depending on how the term legacy is defined. The Olympic
Charter highlights the IOC’s desire to promote “positive legacies”; Hiller (2003),
Kaplanidou (2012) and others used the more neutral term “outcomes”.
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An important and classic distinction is made between intermmediate and final out-
comes (Pollitt & Et Bouckaert, 2011: 16). An intermmediate outcome is a direct con-
sequence of staging the Games, whereas a final outcome is a contribution to the host
territory’s objectives and vision, which should be defined during the bid stage. An
Olympic stadium used for a relatively short period (several years) beginning at or just
before the Games is an example of an intermmediate outcome. Athens’ Panathinaikos
Stadium, which was rebuilt in marble for the 1894 Olympics (athletics), used for the
2004 Games (archery and finish of the marathon), still hosts certain ceremonies and
competitions and has become a city monument, is an example of a final outcome.
Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park is currently an intermmediate outcome; the well-being
it will provide for future generations of visitors and locals is a final outcome. Final
outcomes, which can be considered contributions to a territory’s tangible or intan-
gible heritage, as defined in the UNESCO world heritage conventions (Chappelet,
2015), can never be guaranteed.
The IOC envisions six types of positive legacy (intermmediate and final outcomes),
which it divides into two categories: structural changes and innovation left after the
Games in space (urban development; environment enhancement) or in people (policy;
human skills, knowledge and networks; brand equity; beliefs and behaviour). In the
case of London 2012, objectives 1c, 2 and 5 (DCMS, 2008) can be considered to focus
on intermmediate outcomes, whereas objectives 1a, 1b, 3 and 4 are more concerned
with final outcomes and correspond to long-term public policies. Applying the IOC’s
categorisation, objectives 1c, 2 and 4 concern space, whereas objectives 1a, 1b, 3 and
5 affect people. Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park will probably become part of
London’s heritage, alongside Hyde Park and Regent Park, large areas of greenery
within the city that were set aside at the beginning of the 19th century and which are
now considered the “green lungs” of London.
In order to assess Games performance, the four parameters presented above (the
four vertices of the Olympic diamond) have to be evaluated with respect to five crite-
ria: efficiency, efficacy, economy, allocative efficiency and effectiveness (the five edges
of the diamond). The following paragraphs present each of these criteria in more
detail and, using London 2012 as an example, show how they can be used to provide
an overview of Games performance and management.
Efficiency is the relationship between the resources invested in a project (inputs)
and its productions (outputs). A project is deemed efficient when the desired produc-
tions are obtained while expending the least resources, that is, when there is minimal
wastage of resources, especially financial and human resources. The Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method can be used to assess the efficiency of public-
sector organisations.
In the case of hosting the Olympic Games, the aim is to minimise the cost of
delivering the event while providing the required quality, as defined in the Host City
Contract and its appendixes. Clearly, some recent Olympic Games have cost more
than others. This may be due to a lack of efficiency by the OCOG’s management
and/or to other local factors, such as the cost of living in the host city or corruption
in the host country. The IOC’s Games Management 2020 strategy aims to reduce the
cost of both bidding for and delivering the Games (following recommendations 1, 3
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and 12 of Agenda 2020 roadmap for the coming years, IOC, 2014). The OECD
(Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation) recently proposed ex-
ante control mechanisms to better manage the procurement processes of large infra-
structure projects and thus reduce/eliminate corruption.
The total cost of London 2012 (approximately GB£11,331 million) was probably
much lower than that of Beijing 2008 or Rio 2016, although it is difficult to ascertain
the budgets for either of these events with any certainty. Hence, London 2012 can be
said to have been more efficient than both its predecessor and its successor, even if
LOCOG’s glowing report should not be taken entirely at face value (see Girginov,
2014: 7-8). The question remains as to whether Summer Games can be delivered at
even lower cost.
Traditionally, efficacy measures the relation between the objectives set and produc-
tions (outputs). The aim is to determine whether the right objectives were set com-
pared with the outputs obtained. In the case of an Olympic project, this equates to
knowing whether the Games and associated programmes were the right vehicle for
attaining the objectives that were set, either when drawing up the bid or, as for
London 2012, after the Games were obtained. The answer to this question is political
and depends on the territory’s development needs, especially in terms of urban devel-
opment, and the objectives set, in terms of how ambitious they are and their validity
in the eyes of the host population. (Did the British public see the value of London’s
objective 1b?) Hence, efficacy is a criterion that must be examined before deciding to
bid for the Games, otherwise there is a risk of opposition to hosting them after they
are obtained (as at Vancouver 2010) or of being forced to withdraw from hosting
them (as for Denver, replaced by Innsbruck for the 1976 Winter Olympics). One way
of resolving this political conundrum is to hold a referendum before launching a bid
(as Hamburg and Munich did before bidding for the 2024 Summer Olympics and
2022 Winter Olympics, respectively). Non-binding referendums or polls can also
be used.
Economy or relevance examines the relationship between objectives and the
resources allocated to meeting them. Are these resources sufficient to attain the objec-
tives set, which may be too ambitious? Once again, this is a political issue that can
only be settled if objectives are formulated precisely. The Olympic Games have some-
times been seen as the solution to all a city’s problems, a cure for all ills. Of course,
this is not the case, even if the Games can give a boost to certain urban projects and
catalyse others (which can also have drawbacks in terms of local democracy). London
2012’s legacy promises covered just five main objectives, which appeared to be
achievable for the Summer Games (essentially, increase participation in sport; build
an Olympic park and other sports facilities; give the UK a modern image). There
were no pretensions to increase tourism (London is already a major tourist destin-
ation) or improve the transport network (which was done, nevertheless, but through
other budgets).
Allocative efficiency concerns the relation between resources (inputs) and produc-
tions (outcomes). In contrast to efficiency (sometimes referred to as technical or pro-
ductive efficiency), which is directly concerned with the cost of the Games, allocative
efficiency is concerned with optimising the way resources are allocated in order to
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obtain the desired outcomes. Hence, it addresses the issue of opportunity cost. Would
it be better to allocate resources directly to obtaining the desired results (depending
on the objectives) or even to other (cheaper) projects aimed at achieving these same
results? Globally, the opportunity cost of the Olympics is favourable if the calculation
is based only on the economic impact due to external inputs obtained through host-
ing the Games, which represent a substantial injection into the territory’s economy
that would not have occurred without them. The allocative efficiency of London 2012
was probably good considering the substantial funds obtained from private external
sources (sponsors, out-of-town spectators and IOC).
Effectiveness measures the relation between outputs and final results (final out-
comes). Are the outputs (i.e., the Games and other programmes associated with
them) those that generate the results expected? The difference between efficacy and
effectiveness is subtle and used most frequently with respect to testing new drugs, but
it can be illustrated through an Olympic example. The efficacy of the Games in
attracting widespread and positive media coverage (output or intermediate result) is
due to the Games’ effectiveness in raising the destination’s profile and image
(intended outcome or final result). Effectiveness raises the issue of the causal relation-
ship between outputs and outcomes.
In 2018, six years after the event, the London 2012 Olympics can be said to have
met objectives 1b, 1c, 2 and 5. However, objective 1a (greatly increasing participation
in sport) is unlikely to be achieved and may be unattainable (Weed et al., 2015).
Indeed, in 2015 the British government decided to change its policy in this area to
improve sport participation. The effectiveness of the Games with respect to objective
3 is also open to discussion: Has London 2012 really inspired a generation of young
people in Britain and abroad? A few more years are needed before a final conclusion
can be reached with respect to objective 4, but things seem to be moving in the right
direction (Moore, 2017). Objective 5 has been attained because the United Kingdom
has improved or maintained its ranking on various country brand indexes (http://
countrybrandingwiki.org/index.php/United_Kingdom), but Brexit (decided by referen-
dum in 2016) has probably had a negative impact on the country’s brand.
Finally, this evaluation framework does not consider causal mechanisms. It does
not explain why outcomes due to the Games took place and therefore identify why a
policy succeeded or failed in a certain context. Only by doing so can future Games
policies be adapted to improve their effectiveness. Realist evaluation methods offer a
possible way of improving understanding of these causes (Henry, 2016: 28).
5. Conclusion
This paper describes the “Olympic diamond”, an approach to assessing Olympic
Games performance, based on concepts used to evaluate public action. The Olympic
diamond highlights the importance of four parameters (the diamond’s vertices: objec-
tives, inputs, outputs and outcomes) for defining and steering an Olympic project,
together with five evaluation criteria (the diamond’s edges: efficiency, efficacy, econ-
omy, allocative efficiency and effectiveness). It brings together two fundamental issues
inherent to every Olympic project: quality delivery/staging and a positive legacy/
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heritage. In particular, it highlights the need to define clear and appropriate objectives
for the project and to differentiate between outputs (delivery of the Games and asso-
ciated programmes) and outcomes (desired results over the longer term).
The Olympic diamond builds on earlier approaches to evaluating overall Games
performance, most notably the economic impact studies carried out since the 1980s,
the IOC’s OGI model, which was applied in full to Vancouver 2010, and the meta-
evaluation commissioned for London 2012. The Olympic diamond can be used to
increase the transparency and accountability of organising the Games, as called for by
Stewart (2012) following her in-depth experience of working with LOCOG.
The next step is to assess the Olympic diamond’s strengths and weaknesses by test-
ing it on concrete cases. This is currently being done with respect to the first three
editions of the Winter Youth Olympic Games (ex-post for Innsbruck 2012 and
Lillehammer 2016, ex-ante for Lausanne 2020), thereby comparing the performance
of three editions of the same event over 12 years.
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